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COMMENT
CLEANING THE DIRTY LAUNDRY:
WASHING OUT LAW ENFORCEMENT’S
PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS
TED HALLER*
“I make my living off the Evening News / Just Giving me something-
something I can use / People love it when you lose,
They love dirty laundry.”1
INTRODUCTION
“Chief: Suspect is ‘cold-blooded murderer.’”2
It happens so often that it has become cliche´. A police chief, sheriff, or
other law enforcement official holds a press conference or conducts an in-
terview, during which he calls a suspect “cold-blooded,”3 a “monster,”4 or
“cowardly.”5 Or, if you are Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the sheriff of Maricopa
County, Arizona, and self-described “America’s Toughest Sheriff,”6 there
is no need to wait for the media to ask about your judgments of a suspect
when a press release will suffice.7
* Northwestern University, B.S. 2005; University of St. Thomas School of Law, J.D. 2014.
The author sends an enormous thank you to Professor Neil Hamilton for all of his help, encour-
agement, and brilliance in helping me write this Comment. And thank you to every member of the
University of St. Thomas Law Journal for the wise feedback.
1. Don Henley, Dirty Laundry, on DIRTY LAUNDRY (Asylum Records 1982).
2. Sara Murphy, Chief: Suspect is ‘cold-blooded murderer,’ WWAY NEWSCHANNEL 3 (Oct.
3, 2013, 11:53 PM), http://www.wwaytv3.com/2013/10/03/chief-suspect-cold-blooded-murderer.
3. See, e.g., id.
4. See, e.g., Susanne M. Schafer, Sheriff accuses suspect of being “monster” for taking part
in search for missing teen, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Aug. 12, 2012), http://chronicle.augusta
.com/news/2012-08-30/sheriff-accuses-suspect-being-monster-taking-part-search-missing-teen.
5. See, e.g., Douglass Dowty, Sheriff identifies ‘cowardly’ man on the run who left passen-
ger to die after Clay crash, SYRACUSE.COM (Aug. 12, 2013, 12:51 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/
news/index.ssf/2013/08/sheriffs_deputies_still_searching_for_cowardly_man_who_left_passenger
_to_die_aft.html.
6. About Sheriff Joe Arpaio, MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, http://www.mcso.org/
About/Sheriff.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
7. For example, in press releases issued two days apart, Sheriff Arpaio called one suspect
“an unfit mother” and another “sick.” NEWSRelease, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff
249
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-2\UST203.txt unknown Seq: 2 21-MAY-15 14:00
250 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:2
Prosecutors are not supposed to make extrajudicial comments that
have a “substantial likelihood” of prejudicing a criminal defendant; Rule
3.8(f) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct8 (hereinafter
“Model Rules”) prohibits it.9 However, when making public comments,
prosecutors do not always follow Rule 3.8(f).10 And prosecutors rarely face
discipline for their extrajudicial comments.11
But prosecutors are not the only people who speak to the press. In fact,
prosecutors are not even the main source for journalists covering criminal
matters—the police are.12 Partially for this reason, the Model Rules impose
an additional duty on prosecutors: to “exercise reasonable care to prevent
investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons as-
sisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an
extrajudicial comment that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making
under . . . this Rule.”13 Unfortunately, exercising reasonable care to prevent
law enforcement personnel from making prejudicial, extrajudicial com-
ments is challenging, and the Model Rules provide little guidance on how
much supervision prosecutors should exercise over law enforcement.
This Comment will explore the relationship between prosecutors and
law enforcement personnel in adhering to Rule 3.8(f), and it will argue that
neither the rule nor current practice adequately protects criminal defendants.
Arpaio announces arrest of mother of two-year-old girl found wandering Anthem neighborhood
(June 11, 2013), available at http://www.mcso.org/MultiMedia/PressRelease/Nichole%20Hockett
%20Booked.pdf; NEWSRelease, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff’s Office Tracks
Down Woman Who Released Dogs into Desert (June 12, 2013), available at http://www.mcso
.org/MultiMedia/PressRelease/Dogs%20Abandoned%20Leads%20to%20Charges.pdf.
8. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct have been adopted, or adopted with
minor changes, by forty-seven states and the District of Columbia. Abigail H. Lipman, Extrajudi-
cial Comments and the Special Responsibilities of Prosecutors: Failings of the Model Rules in
Today’s Media Age, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1516, n.18 (2010) (citing STEPHEN GILLERS ET
AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3 (2009)).
9. “The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . refrain from making extrajudicial comments
that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused . . . .” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2003).
10. Pat Fitzgerald, United States attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, arguably vio-
lated Model Rule 3.8(f) in a press conference announcing criminal charges against Rod
Blagojevich, the governor of Illinois at the time. However, Illinois adopted a standard with a
higher threshold for prejudice: “extrajudicial comments that would pose a serious and imminent
threat of heightening public condemnation of the accused  . . . .” (emphasis added) Kelly Seles-
nick, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Will Pat Fitzgerald’s Public Statements Prejudice Rod
Blagojevich’s Trial?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 827, 828 n.15, 832–33 (2010). In the conference,
Fitzgerald called Blagojevich’s conduct “appalling,” and enough to make “Lincoln roll over in his
grave.” Transcript: Justice Department Briefing on Blagojevich Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/us/politics/09text-illinois.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0.
11. Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 753
(2001).
12. See Steven Chermak & Alexander Weiss, Maintaining Legitimacy Using External Com-
munication Strategies: An Analysis of Police-Media Relations, 33 J. CRIM. JUS. 501, 503 (2005).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2003).
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Part I of this Comment will examine how the Model Rules, the courts, and
other guidelines and policies dictate how the courts, prosecutors, and the
police should balance a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment14 right to a
fair trial against the First Amendment’s15 freedom of speech. Part II will
argue that law enforcement’s extrajudicial comments are increasingly preju-
dicial to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Part III will argue that the
current rules fail to adequately protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Part
IV will offer solutions that strengthen a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights by reducing the prejudicial, extrajudicial comments made by law en-
forcement personnel.
I. THE DIFFICULT BALANCE
“It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair
trial and safeguarding the right of free expression.”16
The steps of a press conference are as routine as those at a Catholic
Mass. On a Louisiana summer day in 2006, a “riot of microphones was
perched atop a podium emblazoned with the state seal and surrounded by
flags.”17 Staff handed out materials to the media—on this day, “arrest war-
rants in dark-blue folders.”18 There was a sign-in sheet.19 A “gray-haired
attorney general” entered and “walked stiffly” to the podium.20 Cameras
flashed and clattered.21 Showtime.
What happens next in the press conference is governed by Rule 3.8(f),
which this Comment addresses; however, it is difficult to fully and fairly
discuss the rule without first addressing the history of the Model Rules’
treatment of trial publicity. This part of the Comment will discuss the text
of Model Rule 3.8(f), and its relationship with Rule 3.6, the Supreme
Court’s constitutional analyses of the rules, prosecutors’ additional rules
and guidelines concerning extrajudicial comments, and police guidelines on
trial publicity.
14. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend VI.
15. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (2003).
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A. A Brief Background of the ABA’s Trial Publicity Rules
The Model Rules contain two significant trial publicity rules: Rules
3.622 and 3.8(f).23 The exact language of each rule is vital to understanding
the scope and flexibility of Rules 3.6 and 3.8(f).
Rule 3.6, entitled “Trial Publicity,” states that attorneys “shall not
make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know will be disseminated by public communication and will have a sub-
stantial likelihood of materially prejudicing” a case.24 The rule is impera-
tive, yet the various components of the sentence, italicized for emphasis,
introduce subjectivity and imprecision to the interpretation; the objective
test turns on whether a reasonable lawyer would believe a comment
presented a “clear and weighty” likelihood of prejudice.25
22. Model Rule 3.6 states:
(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a
matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the iden-
tity of the persons involved;
(2) information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of a matter in progress;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;
[ . . . ]
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in ap-
prehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the
investigation.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer
would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect
of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client. A statement made
pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate
the recent adverse publicity . . . . Id.
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2003).
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
25. Looking at the key words of the rule, the use of “shall not” denotes that the rule is
imperative, defining “proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT SCOPE (2003). Next, “reasonably” is defined in the Rules as when “the lawyer
believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2003). Thus, reasonability is an objective test. See id.
“Substantial” is a “material matter of clear and weighty importance.” Id.
Finally, a comment to the rule offers examples of subjects “that are more likely than not to
have a material prejudicial effect,” including: a person’s “character, credibility, and criminal re-
cord,” the existence of any confessions, the results of any test or nature of physical evidence, any
opinion on the guilt of a suspect, prejudicial inadmissible evidence, and the “fact that a defendant
has been charged with a crime.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) cmt. 5 (2003).
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Further complicating Rule 3.6, the drafters added some exceptions that
allow for extrajudicial comments, including the opportunity to respond to
the “substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by
the lawyer or the lawyer’s client,” to warn of a dangerous individual, and
provide basic details of a suspect and the arrest.26 However, prefacing the
exceptions, the rule notes that the attorney “may” release the information,
meaning the exceptions are “permissive”—in contrast to the imperative de-
fault rule.27 While Rule 3.6 applies to civil and criminal matters, plaintiffs
and prosecutors, and defense attorneys,28 Rule 3.8, entitled “Special Re-
sponsibilities of the Prosecutor,” applies additional duties only to prosecu-
tors in criminal matters.29 Like with Rule 3.6, the exact language is
important to understanding Rule 3.8. Rule 3.8(f), with the portion relevant
to this Comment in bold, reads:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . except for state-
ments that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and
extent of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law
enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial com-
ments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public
condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to
prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees
or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in
a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that
the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule
3.6 or this Rule.30
Rule 3.8(f) is hardly a powerful mandate but the intent is clear: prose-
cutors should strive toward avoiding prejudicial, extrajudicial comments,
and make sure there are measures in place to reasonably ensure that law
enforcement officials also comply. The use of “refrain” renders the rule
aspirational rather than imperative.31 In addition to prosecutors scrutinizing
their own comments, the rule calls for prosecutors to “exercise reasonable
care” to prevent law enforcement from making prejudicial, extrajudicial
26. Id. at 3.6(c).
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b)–(c) (2003).
28. See id.
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2003).
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2003) (emphasis added).
31. The use of “refrain” in Rule 3.8(f) leans the rule toward an aspiration rather than an
imperative, especially given that the drafters were deliberate in their word choice as evidenced by
subparts (c) and (e), which use the stronger language of “shall not” or “shall make”—in contrast
to the weaker “refrain” in subpart (f). See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2003).
“Refrain,” while not defined in the Rule, means to “keep oneself from doing, feeling, or indulging
in something and especially from following a passing impulse.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/refrain?show=0&t=1386349639. A
comment to Rule 3.8(f) also seems to suggest that the rule is aspirational, noting that a “prosecutor
can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a
substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) cmt. 5 (2003).
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comments, which—as suggested in a related rule—likely entails measures
that assure police compliance, including educating and periodically review-
ing law enforcement behavior.32
Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8 were not the bar’s first attempt to address trial
publicity.33 Alabama issued the first code of legal ethics that contained a
provision about attorneys’ extrajudicial statements in 1887, but there was
no nationwide code until the ABA issued the “Canons of Professional Eth-
ics” in 1908, which were soon adopted by many states.34
However, it took the murder of a presidential assassin to get the bar to
take trial publicity more seriously.35 The Warren Commission, charged with
investigating the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, found that
media coverage might have indirectly contributed to the murder of the sus-
pected assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald—and recommended that lawyers, po-
lice, and the media work together to ensure an individual’s right to a fair
trial.36 The ABA responded by creating the “Reardon Committee,”37 which
would go on to draft the precursor rule38 to Rules 3.6 and 3.8.39
The United States Supreme Court would also have its say in the craft-
ing of the language.40
B. The Supreme Court Tries to Strike a Balance
The current legal standards for pretrial and trial publicity are the result
of a series of Supreme Court cases; this sub-section will briefly provide the
facts, legal reasoning, and holdings of those key cases.
32. Rule 5.1 is comparable in that it governs the managerial responsibilities of partners or
supervisory lawyers in law firms, a concept similar to the responsibility of prosecutors over law
enforcement in Rule 3.8(f). See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2003). Rule 5.1 states
that a partner “shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct”; a
comment to Rule 5.1 suggests “periodic review of compliance” in small firms, “more elaborate
measures” in large firms, and “continuing legal education” in firms of all sizes. Id. at cmt. 3.
Moreover, Rule 5.3 applies a similar supervisory standard to the supervision of nonlawyers by
lawyers: “reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obli-
gations of the lawyer . . . .” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2003).
33. See Lipman, supra note 8, at 1515–16; see also Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., “May It Please the
Camera, . . . I Mean the Court”-An Intrajudicial Solution to an Extrajudicial Problem, 39 GA. L.
REV. 83, 95–96 (2004).
34. Lipman, supra note 8, at 1516. Section 17 of the Alabama Code provided that
“[n]ewspaper publications by an attorney as to the merits of pending or anticipated litigation  . . .
tend to prevent a fair trial in the courts, and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
It requires a strong case to justify such publications . . . .” Id. (citing ALA. CODE OF ETHICS § 17
(1987)).
35. Brown, supra note 33, at 96.
36. Id.
37. The committee was named after its chair, Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Paul
Reardon. Id. at 97.
38. The rule was the Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107. Id. at 98, n.67.
39. Id. at 98.
40. See id. at 97.
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1. The Dr. Sheppard “Carnival” Leads to the “Reasonable
Likelihood” Standard
On Independence Day, 1954, a pregnant woman went to bed.41 She
was found the next day “bludgeoned to death,” and a media firestorm
erupted.42 Television shows, radio broadcasts, and newspaper articles—in-
cluding a front-page editorial—pushed for the woman’s husband, Dr. Sam
Sheppard, to face murder charges.43 Weeks after “the ‘editorial artillery’
opened fire,” Dr. Sheppard was indicted. But the media firestorm only grew
stronger at trial.44
Inside the courtroom, a special table was set up for the media, with the
first three rows in the gallery reserved for the press, and all rooms on that
floor of the courtroom were used by reporters.45 Sometimes the movement
of people in and out of the courtroom made it difficult for participants in the
trial to hear each other speak.46 While Dr. Sheppard testified on the witness
stand, a police officer issued a press release calling Dr. Sheppard a “[b]are-
faced [l]iar.”47 Outside the courthouse, cameras followed the jury—pictures
of them appeared more than “40 times in the Cleveland papers alone.” The
jurors had no instructions to “not read or listen to anything concerning the
case.”48 As for the judge, he participated in a “staged interview” while
walking into the courthouse; he also happened to be up for a “hotly con-
tested election”—as was the chief prosecutor.49 The jury convicted Dr.
Sheppard of second-degree murder.50
Dr. Sheppard appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, which
reversed his denial of a habeas petition, and ordered the doctor released
from prison.51 In a second trial in 1966, Dr. Sheppard was acquitted.52
In Sheppard, the Supreme Court walked the tightrope between the
Sixth and First Amendments, noting that “justice cannot survive behind
walls of silence,” but that the “carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have
been avoided . . . .”53 Most relevant to the future of the Model Rules, the
Court held:
41. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966).
42. Id. at 339.
43. See id. at 339–41.
44. See id. at 341–49.
45. Id. at 342–43.
46. Id. at 344.
47. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 349.
48. Id. at 343–45, 353. The jury was “sequestered” for its deliberations, but jurors had been
allowed to call home every day of their five days of deliberations. Id. at 349.
49. Id. at 343–45, 354.
50. Id. at 335.
51. Id. at 363.
52. Dr. Sam Sheppard, 46, Dies; Imprisoned for Wife’s Murder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 1970),
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F30A1FFC3E5A157493C5A9178FD85F448785
F9.
53. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 349, 358.
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But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news
prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the
case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so
permeated with publicity . . . If publicity during the proceedings
threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered.54
Hence, the first ABA standard required attorneys to avoid making extrajudi-
cial statements that had a reasonable likelihood of preventing a fair trial.55
2. A Problem “As Old as the Republic”56 Leads to the
“Substantial Likelihood” Standard
One fall evening in 1975, in a small town in Nebraska, a family of six
was found dead in their house.57 “[W]idespread news coverage” followed—
locally, regionally, and nationally.58 Soon after the arrest of Erwin Simants,
the prosecutor and the defense attorney successfully asked the court to enter
an order “prohibiting those in attendance [at the trial] from ‘releas[ing] or
authoriz[ing] the release for public dissemination in any form or manner
whatsoever any testimony given or evidence adduced . . . .’”59
The press was not pleased, and they attempted to get the order va-
cated.60 Instead, another judge61 found that the nature of the crimes created
a “clear and present danger that pre-trial publicity could impinge upon the
defendant’s right to a fair trial,” applying the order until a jury was impan-
eled and restricted journalists from reporting on five topics.62 The Nebraska
Supreme Court upheld the order but reduced its scope to prohibiting the
reporting of three subjects.63
The U.S. Supreme Court was next, and the majority pointed out early
in the opinion that the “problems presented by this case are almost as old as
the Republic.”64 After vacillating between discussions of the First and Sixth
Amendments, observing that the “authors of the Bill of Rights did not un-
dertake to assign priorities” to either amendment, and concluding that “prior
restraints on speech . . . are the least tolerable infringement on First Amend-
ment rights,” the Court reversed the Nebraska Supreme Court.65 However,
54. Id. at 363. (emphasis added).
55. See Brown, supra note 33, at 97.
56. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976).
57. Id. at 542.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 543.
61. Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 543. The petitioners intervened in state district court; the
case had since been transferred over from county court where a different judge issued the initial
order on public dissemination. Id.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 545. The three protected subjects were confessions to officers, confessions to third
parties other than the press, and other facts “strongly implicative” of the defendant. Id.
64. Id. at 547.
65. Id. at 559–61, 570.
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the Court upheld the “clear and present danger” test for determining
whether pre-trial publicity would interfere with a defendant’s right to a fair
trial.66 The Court had moved to a more “stringent” test, tipping the see-saw
of Constitutional balance toward the First Amendment.67
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding, the Model Rules were up-
dated.68 Instead of adopting the “clear and present danger”69 test verbatim,
the Rules struck a compromise between “reasonable likelihood” and “clear
and present danger,” adopting a “substantial likelihood” standard.70 A com-
ment to Rule 3.6 listed subjects likely to prejudice a jury, such as the “char-
acter, credibility, reputation, or criminal record of a party.”71 Additionally,
Rule 3.8(e)—the precursor to Rule 3.8(f)—emerged, requiring prosecutors
to “exercise reasonable care to prevent” law enforcement officials from
making any extrajudicial statement that a “prosecutor would be prohibited
from making under Rule 3.6.”72 But what would the Supreme Court say
about the new standard?
3. The “Substantial Likelihood” Standard (Seemingly) Passes its
Constitutional Test
It was the night before an attorney planned to hold a press conference
about his client, and the attorney was curious: did Nevada’s version of Rule
3.6 allow him speak publicly in the hours after his client was indicted?73
After researching the issue for several hours, the attorney decided he
could.74 The attorney made his statement.75 Fortunately for his client, a jury
later acquitted the defendant on all counts.76 Unfortunately for the attorney,
he was disciplined by the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board of the State
Bar for violating Nevada’s version of Rule 3.6.77 The attorney’s case made
its way to the Supreme Court.78
The Supreme Court, in two 5-4 majority opinions, upheld the “sub-
stantial likelihood” standard but also held that it was incorrectly applied to
66. Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S at 562–63.
67. See Lipman, supra note 8, at 1520; see also Brown, supra note 33, at 100.
68. See Brown, supra note 33, at 100.
69. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice did adopt the “clear and present danger” test.
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1067–68 (1991).
70. Lipman, supra note 8, at 1520.
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 5 (1983); Lipman, supra note 8, at
1520–21.
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e).
73. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033, 1044.
74. Id. at 1044.
75. Id. at 1042–43. Among his remarks, the attorney said that the evidence showed his client
was innocent, that the real thief was a police detective, and that other witnesses were not credible.
Id. at 1045.
76. Id. at 1033.
77. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033.
78. Before appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court, the attorney had appealed to the Nevada
Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the disciplinary board. Id.
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the Nevada attorney, thereby reversing the Nevada Supreme Court.79 Chief
Justice William Rehnquist wrote in the first majority opinion that “we agree
with the majority of the [s]tates that the ‘substantial likelihood of material
prejudice’ standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance be-
tween the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the
State’s interest in fair trials.”80
In the other majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that the
case was a “poor vehicle” to assess a court’s ability to regulate an attorney’s
speech, but that the attorney’s comments did not demonstrate any “threat to
the legal process . . . .”81 Notably, Justice Kennedy suggested in his dicta
that defense attorneys have greater freedom to speak than the “police, the
prosecution, and other government officials” who hold “innumerable ave-
nues for the dissemination of information adverse to the criminal defen-
dant,” whereas a defendant “cannot speak without fear of incriminating
himself . . . .”82 Nonetheless, the “substantial likelihood” test passed the
Supreme Court, although its boundaries remained undefined.83
Today’s Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8 include the “stringent” and “subjec-
tive” “substantial likelihood” standard, printed infra. Additionally, com-
ments to Rule 3.8 note that a prosecutor “has the responsibility of a minister
of justice and not that simply of an advocate,” and “should[ ] avoid com-
ments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose . . . .”84
C. The Prosecutor’s Duties in Striking a Balance
The Model Rules are not the only rules related to trial publicity that
prosecutors are required to follow. There are a variety of federal and local
rules that supplement or reiterate the Model Rules.85
U.S. attorneys must adhere to federal regulations outlined in Title 28
of the Code of Federal Regulations.86 The regulations forbid “personnel of
the Department of Justice” from releasing “information for the purpose of
influencing a trial . . . .”87 The regulations list the types of objective infor-
mation88 that personnel can release for criminal matters, while also stating
that “[d]isclosures should . . . not include subjective observations.”89 Addi-
79. Id. at 1058, 1076.
80. Id. at 1075.
81. Id. at 1057–58.
82. Id. at 1056.
83. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1057.
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1, 5.
85. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2014).
86. Id. See also Laurie L. Levenson, Prosecutorial Sound Bites: When Do They Cross The
Line? 44 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1035 (2010).
87. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(a).
88. The regulations allow personnel to release a defendant’s name, age, residence, employ-
ment, marital status, the charge(s), investigating agency, and “circumstances immediately sur-
rounding an arrest . . . .” Id. § 50.2(b).
89. Id.
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tionally, the regulations state that personnel “should refrain” from disclos-
ing information that could create a danger of prejudice, such as
observations about a defendant’s character.90
The United States Attorneys’ Manual (hereinafter “USAM”) also has
policies related to trial publicity that “parallel” the federal regulations, but
offer more specificity.91 The USAM begins by noting that its guidelines
balance the “right of the public to know,” “an individual’s right to a fair
trial,” and “the government’s ability to effectively enforce the administra-
tion of justice.”92 The USAM lays out specific guidelines on press confer-
ences, which it says “should be held only for the most significant and
newsworthy actions, or if a particularly important deterrent or law enforce-
ment purpose would be served.”93 In addition, the USAM lists “exceptional
circumstances” when it “may be appropriate” to have a press conference,
including crimes with a “heinous or extraordinary nature,” an “imminent
threat to the community,” or when “a request for public assistance is vi-
tal.”94 Generally, the USAM follows much of the intent of the Model Rules
in that it prohibits personnel from disclosing information that would have a
“substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding.”95
In addition to the rules and guidelines followed by federal prosecutors,
there are a variety of other federal, state, county, municipal, and court rules
that offer varying degrees of specificity.96 For example, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota states that it is “the duty of a lawyer” to
not release information “if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissem-
ination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due admin-
istration of justice.”97
D. The Police’s Role in Striking a Balance
Law enforcement agencies also have their own rules concerning trial
publicity.98 At the federal level, the same Department of Justice regulations
90. Id. § 50.2(b)(6). The regulations forbid dissemination of information “concerning a de-
fendant’s prior criminal record.” Id. § 50.2(b)(4).
91. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, 1-7.000 (1997), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/; Levenson, supra note 86, at
1037–38.
92. UNITED STATE ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 1-7.110.
93. Id. at 1-7.401(A).
94. Id. at 1-7.401(C).
95. See id. at 1-7.500.
96. See, e.g., MINN. LR 83.2 (Oct. 13, 2014), available at http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/local
_rules/Local-Rules-Master.pdf.
97. Id.
98. See e.g., MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP’T  POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL, 6-200 available
at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/policy/mpdpolicy_6-200_6-200 (last visited Nov. 14,
2014); CHI. POLICE DEP’T, NEWS MEDIA GUIDELINES GEN. ORDER G09-02 (Dec. 28, 2012), avail-
able at http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12937790-40c12-9382-0d6eaf
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that apply to U.S. attorneys also apply to Justice Department law enforce-
ment personnel, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter “FBI”)
agents and U.S. Marshals.99
Some local departments have rules on trial publicity as well.100 For
example, the Los Angeles Police Department has a short guideline that
mentions free press as an “essential element of the First Amendment,” en-
courages media to be told “all that can be told that will not impinge on a
person’s right to a fair trial, seriously impede a criminal investigation, im-
peril a human life, or seriously endanger the security of the people.”101 The
King County (Washington) Sheriff’s Office has a policy stating that “de-
partment members should release all reasonable information about an event
to the news media upon request,”102 and when discussing a suspect,
“[g]eneral details of the alleged offense.” However, an introduction to the
manual notes that what follows “are not hard, fast rules, but policies and
procedures for delivering police services to you.”103
II. IF IT BLEEDS, IT LEADS—AND TWEETS, POSTS, BLOGS, AND E-MAILS
“Who controls the present controls the past.”104
The press conference that opened Part I of this Comment took place
about a year after Hurricane Katrina, and the attorney general used the oc-
casion to announce the arrests of two nurses and a doctor at a New Orleans
hospital.105 Investigators believed the medical professionals had engaged in
mercy killing—second-degree murder in the prosecutor’s opinion.106 The
attorney general told the reporters that this was “not euthanasia. This is
plain-and-simple homicide,” and then provided the caveat that homicide
had to be proven in court.107 Most reporters did not include the caveat in
their stories, instead opting for the “inflammatory quote.”108
This part of the Comment will explain: why extrajudicial comments
receive oversized coverage in the media; why the police-and-reporter rela-
tionship often works against the accused; why police (and prosecutors) have
little control over how their comments are passed on to the public; why
e597221637.html; L.A. POLICE DEP’T, 2014 1ST QUARTER MANUAL, sec. 115, available at http://
www.lapdonline.org/lapd_manual/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
99. 28 C.F.R. § 0.1 (2014).
100. See e.g., MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP’T, supra note 98; CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 98;
L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 98.
101. L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 98.
102. KING CNTY. SHERIFF, GEN. ORDERS MANUAL, 1.06.025 (July 10, 2009), available at
http://www.kingcounty.gov/safety/sheriff/About/~/media/safety/sheriff/documents/g/GOM.ashx.
103. Id. at 2 (introductory letter from Sheriff Susan L. Rahr).
104. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 533 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1987).
105. FINK, supra note 17, at 342–43.
106. Id. at 343.
107. Id. at 344.
108. Id.
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social media inflames the spread of information; and how the information
goes on to affect the public—including jurors.
A. The Police-Media Criminal Industrial Complex
Crime stories are popular; according to a study in 1995, crime com-
prised 25 percent of the coverage in newspapers and 20 percent in televi-
sion.109 Crime is often the most popular type of news story in a newspaper
or television broadcast.110 And while traditional media audiences have be-
come more fragmented, a 2013 study by the Pew Research Center found
that during a month, 75 percent of U.S. adults watch local television news
and 65 percent view network newscasts.111 Another 2013 Pew study found
that, despite the increasing popularity of social media as a news source, 42
percent of people who seek news on Facebook also watch local television
news.112
Moreover, ownership of local television stations is consolidating: a
2013 study found that thirteen owners control 85 percent of the major affili-
ated stations in the country’s twenty-five largest media markets.113 Declin-
ing diversity of ownership will likely lead to a decline in diversity of story
selections as fewer voices contribute to editorial decisions.
From whom, then, do journalists receive their crime information? The
most popular source is the police officer.114 The police “are easily accessi-
ble, constantly available, and willing to participate to control crime
images.”115 In fact, according to one study, law enforcement “represented
between 25 and 45 percent of the sources cited in crime stories.”116 The
police have become such a popular and default source for reporters that
stories will often use the “generic ‘police said’ without specific attribu-
tion.”117 Therefore, “[p]olice are by far the most visible of all criminal jus-
tice institutions . . . .”118
109. Chermak & Weiss, supra note 12, at 503; Steven Chermak, Image Control: How Police
Affect the Presentation of Crime Stories, 14 AM. J. POLICE 2, 22 (1995).
110. See Steven Chermak, Crime in the News Media: A Refined Understanding of How Crime
Becomes News, in 10 MEDIA, PROCESS, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CRIME 95, 97 (Gregg
Barak ed., 1995).
111. AMY MITCHELL, ET AL., HOW AMERICANS GET TV NEWS AT HOME 1 (Pew Research
Center 2013), available at http://www.journalism.org/files/2013/10/Nielsen_Latest_10-11.pdf.
112. AMY MITCHELL, ET AL., THE ROLE OF NEWS ON FACEBOOK 2 (Pew Research Center
2013), available at http://www.journalism.org/files/2013/10/facebook_news_10-24-2013.pdf.
113. S. DEREK TURNER, CEASE TO RESIST: HOW THE FCC’S FAILURE TO ENFORCE ITS RULES
CREATED A NEW WAVE OF MEDIA CONSOLIDATION 2 (Free Press 2013), available at http://www
.freepress.net/sites/default/files/resources/Cease_to_Resist_Oct._2013_0.pdf.
114. See Chermak & Weiss, supra note 12, at 503.
115. Chermak, supra note 110, at 29.
116. Chermak, supra note 12, at 503.
117. Chermak, supra note 110, at 31. As a reporter, the author of this Comment can attest to
frequently beginning his television reports with “police say.”
118. Chermak, supra note 12, at 502.
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Given law enforcement’s vital role in shaping news coverage, reporters
and police have developed a mutually beneficial relationship.119 The police
need the media “in order to manufacture a legitimate reputation.”120 The
media need the police as a convenient, easily accessible source “in order to
produce stories about crime efficiently.”121 Therefore, reporters are careful
to avoid burning bridges with the police, and lose them as a source122—
incentivizing coverage that glorifies police (and indirectly, the prosecution)
and shames the criminal.123
Once the media’s incentive to attract readers and viewers is factored
in, the pro-police/anti-defense bias124 is magnified by sensationalism, spec-
ulation, and a need to feed the public’s curiosity for often lurid details.125
Furthermore, once a criminal case enters the public sphere and grabs the
attention of the media, both the police and prosecution lose control of the
narrative as unsubstantiated reports and opinions replace any official record
of the case.126 For example, when members of Duke University’s lacrosse
team were accused of rape in 2006, the media falsely reported that one of
the suspects had been arrested for “gay bashing,” and commentators “la-
beled the players racist” with little substantiation.127
The mass shooting at Columbine High School in 1999 demonstrated
that, once a news event becomes public—via police reportage or live televi-
sion feeds—it belongs to the public, and investigators’ grip on the narrative
erodes.128 In the days and months after the shooting, the media falsely re-
ported that the spooky “Trench Coat Mafia” was behind the attack, that
119. Id. at 504; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Duke Lacrosse Players and the Media: Why
the Fair Trial-Free Press Paradigm Doesn’t Cut It Anymore, in RACE TO INJUSTICE: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 175, 183 (Michael L. Seigel, ed., 2009).
120. Chermak & Weiss, supra note 12, at 501.
121. See Chermak, supra note 110, at 26; see also Chermak, Crime in the News, supra note
111, at 97; Mark A. Beebe, Prosecutors, Politics, Press and Prejudice, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 377,
394–95 (2002–2003). Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations:
What the Non-legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 23 (1989).
122. Chermak & Weiss, supra note 12, at 503.
123. See Drechsel, supra note 121, at 23.
124. See Taslitz, supra note 119, at 183–84 (writing that “reporters repeatedly deal in different
cases with the same police officers . . . [y]et a reporter might cross a particular defense attorney’s
path but once, creating less incentive to curry favor with the defense”).
125. See generally, RONALD L. GOLDFARB, TV OR NOT TV: TELEVISION, JUSTICE, AND THE
COURTS 15–16 (New York University Press 1998) (describing the attention “sensational” crimes
receive); see also RICHARD L. FOX ET AL., TABLOID JUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF
MEDIA FRENZY 62 (Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2nd ed. 2007); MARK GERAGOS & PAT HARRIS,
MIS-TRIAL: AN INSIDE LOOK AT HOW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM WORKS . . .  AND SOME-
TIMES DOESN’T 221 (Gotham Books, 2013) (writing that defense attorneys “realize that most arti-
cles about our clients are going to be negative”).
126. See generally, Taslitz, supra note 119, at 192–94.
127. Id. at 195. The now-disbarred district attorney, Mike Nifong, sometimes fueled the false
media reports.
128. See generally, DAVE CULLEN, COLUMBINE 67 (2009) (providing a detailed analysis of the
tragedy at Columbine and the public response).
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both shooters were loners and outcasts, and that one victim had martyred
herself by answering affirmatively to one of the killer’s questions about
whether she believed in God.129 Moreover, imprecise language by the sher-
iff—who “winged” a press conference—magnified false information, such
as the death count, number of shooters, and role of other students.130
In sum, the police have a strong influence on crime coverage, and
sloppiness by either the police or reporters, or both, can lead to sensational
coverage that is anti-defendant or simply wrong.
B. The Social Media Parade
The influence of traditional media outlets has declined while the use of
social media has surged.131 Newspaper newsrooms are 30 percent smaller
than in 2000, network-news audiences are down 55.5 percent compared to
1980, and investigative reporting is declining at local television stations.132
Blogs, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Message Boards, Pinterest, LinkedIn,
and other forms of social networking can all influence journalists, attorneys,
courts, and trials.133
The influence of social media would prove too irresistible for prosecu-
tors in New Orleans, where a “bizarre and appalling turn of events” would
involve—not the tossing of beads on Bourbon Street—but the tossing of
anonymous barbs on a newspaper’s online message board.134 As a result of
this prosecutorial misconduct, former police officers who had been sen-
tenced to prison for gunning down civilians in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina would be ordered released pending a new trial.135 The federal judge
determined that the assistant U.S. attorneys who prosecuted the officers had
been posting comments on the Nola.com website.136 The prosecutors posted
the comments under articles about the New Orleans Police Department,
making assertions that the department was “corrupt,” “ineffectual,” “a joke
for a long time,” and writing phrases like “[t]here is an old Italian proverb:
the fish rots from the head down.”137 In a blistering and lengthy opinion,
Judge Kurt D. Engelhart evaluated the prosecutors’ conduct using the
Model Rules, federal regulations, and local court rules and found that they
129. Id. at 72, 225–33.
130. Id. at 85–86.
131. See generally, Lili Levi, Social Networks and the Law: Social Media and the Press, 90
N.C.L. REV. 1531, 1554, 1572 (2012) (describing the effect social media has had on news con-
sumption); see also J. Paul Zimmerman, A Practical Guide to the Development of Jury Charges
Regarding Social Media, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 641, 641 (2013).
132. Levi, supra note 131, at 1538–46.
133. See Zimmerman, supra note 121, at 641; see also Hon. Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A.
Zuckerman, Ensuring An Impartial Jury in the Age of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1,
7 (2012).
134. United States v. Bower, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (E.D. La. 2013).
135. Id. at 549–50, 627.
136. Id. at 545–58.
137. Id. at 578.
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violated all of them.138 The judge held that the conduct was so “egregious”
that “prejudice need not be shown.”139 Near the end of the opinion, Judge
Engelhart offered a timely warning:
The Court cannot fathom why at least three . . . highly intelli-
gent . . . officials thought posting comments publicly was a good
idea, other than to have their corrosive opinions on public display
for all to see, read, and accept as correct . . . [T]he fact that the
government’s actions were conducted in anonymity makes it all
the more egregious . . . Re-trying this case is a very small price to
pay in order to protect the validity of the verdict in this case, the
institutional integrity of this Court, and the criminal justice sys-
tem as a whole.140
C. Media: The Sound and the Fury
Both traditional and social media can be, as Judge Engelhart recog-
nized, a potent communications-weapon, pushing the “social pressures of
group interactions” and raising the possibility of “groupthink.”141 Social
sciences teach us that what people see, read, and hear in the media can
matter.142
Media coverage can magnify an individual’s preexisting beliefs be-
cause “people are more likely to remember ambiguous information that is
consistent with their schemata than inconsistent information . . . .”143 More-
over, possibly because of the media’s often pro-police bias, “individuals
exposed to actual media reports of crime also develop a pro-prosecution
orientation.”144 If exposed to inadmissible information about a defendant,
“the majority of extant empirical research indicates that jurors do not adhere
to limiting instructions.”145
One empirical study found that “juries exposed to factual publicity
were significantly more likely to convict the defendant than those not ex-
posed.”146 The authors of the study concluded that “it is not disturbing that
voir dire accomplishes so little. What is disturbing is that we expect voir
138. See id. at 568–78.
139. Id. at 620.
140. Id. at 625–27.
141. Levi, supra note 132, at 1565.
142. See generally Edith Greene, Media Effects on Jurors, 14 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 439,
448 (1990) (concluding that “media can have an impact on jury decision making”); see also Joel
D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psycho-
logical Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other
Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCH., PUB. POL., & LAW 677, 679 (2000).
143. Greene, supra note 142, at 445.
144. Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 142, at 679.
145. Id. at 703.
146. Norbert L. Kerr, et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudi-
cial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. 665, 675 (1990–1991).
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dire to accomplish so much.”147 A review of six empirical studies found
that “juries are unwilling (or unable) to set aside information that appears
relevant to determining what happened—regardless of what the law (and
thus the judge) have to say about it.”148 The same review examined a meta-
analysis of 44 studies and found a “modest positive relationship . . . be-
tween exposure to negative pretrial publicity and judgments of guilt.”149
III. MODEL RULE 3.8(F) IS OUT OF TOUCH
“He must be brought to the bar without irons, or any manner of shackle
or bonds; unless there be evident danger of escape.”150
In the days following the press conference that began Parts I and II of
this Comment, information slowly trickled to the press, culminating in a
CNN anchor reporting, “from an act of God, to playing God, accusations of
intentional killings in the wake of Katrina, as one doctor is worried a col-
league may have done the unthinkable.”151 The doctor under investigation
then heard her name in the news report, and was “overcome by anger, grief,
and outrage.”152 The prosecutor had not officially released her name.153 The
police had not officially released her name.154 It did not matter that she was
not charged; the media pressure was too intense.155 She was forced to stop
practicing medicine.156
This part of the Comment will argue: that Rule 3.8(f) is not adequately
followed by prosecutors due to the lack of enforcement; that it is difficult
for prosecutors to supervise law enforcement’s extrajudicial comments; that
political incentives discourage stringent adherence; and that the reality of
the media environment damages those cast as criminals—whether charged
or not.
147. Id. at 699.
148. Dennis J. Devine, et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on De-
liberating Groups, 7 PSY., PUB. POL., & LAW 622, 666 (2000).
149. Id. at 687; see also Nancy Mehrkens Steblay et al., The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on
Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 228 (1999) (finding that
the “data support the hypothesis that negative pretrial publicity significantly affects jurors’ deci-
sions about the culpability of the defendant”).
150. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 317 (1769), availa-
ble at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch25.asp.
151. FINK, supra note 17, at 306.
152. Id. at 307.
153. See id. at 323–85 (noting the many unofficial leaks of information).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 307.
156. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-2\UST203.txt unknown Seq: 18 21-MAY-15 14:00
266 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:2
A. Prosecutors are Rarely Disciplined in Criminal Cases for
Extrajudicial Comments
Prosecutors are either ethical angels or very fortunate because they
rarely face discipline.157 One study found zero, possibly one, reported disci-
pline cases for violations of Rule 3.6,158 which prohibits prejudicial extraju-
dicial comments.159 The study did not examine reported discipline cases for
state rules equivalent to Rule 3.8(f), but if prosecutors avoid discipline for
their own extrajudicial comments under Rule 3.6, then it is unlikely that
they are facing discipline for law enforcement’s comments under Rule
3.8(f).160
The absence of reported discipline cases does not necessarily suggest
that there is any widespread cover-up or moral lapses, but is likely ex-
plained by limited resources, absence of individual clients to bring com-
plaints, a desire for disciplinary authorities to avoid interfering in a case
until it has gone through the entire appellate process, and a high standard of
proof.161 The Model Rules for Lawyer Discipline require proof of miscon-
duct “by clear and convincing evidence,” with the burden of proof on the
disciplinary counsel162—a tough standard given that prosecutors are only to
“refrain” from making prejudicial extrajudicial comments.
If deterrence is one of the purposes for disciplining an individual, then
the author of this Comment is concerned that the lack of discipline for trial
publicity rules may fail to discourage rule-breaking—damaging a citizen’s
right to a fair trial.163
Of course, there are other means, such as criminal contempt, for a
prosecutor to face punishment other than discipline by a disciplinary board.
However, judges rarely use the contempt sanction in “highly publicized
cases when a prosecutor participates in publicity . . . .”164 One prominent
157. See generally Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double
Jeopardy: Case Studies in Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 889 (1998) (“The
prosecutor . . . is not required to explain or justify his actions, let alone have such explanation
subject to appellate review.”); see also BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
§ 14.12 (2d ed. 2002).
158. Because the Model Rules do not govern in every state, the study “attempted to identify
violations of state versions of rules that corresponded to” the rule. Zacharias, supra note 12, at
752, n.107.
159. Id. at 751.
160. The author of this Comment did not find any cases of Rule 3.8(f) violations.
161. See Zacharias, supra note 11, at 756, 758, 762.
162. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 18(3).
163. See generally Zacharias, supra note 11, at 768 (noting “the most obvious example” of
violating publicity rules is “speaking to the press during litigation”).
164. Richard W. Holmes, Prosecutorial Dealing with the Media: Duties, Remedies, and Lia-
bility, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 177, 183 (2003–2004) (citing GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
§§ 6:3–6:7).
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defense attorney argues that “judges don’t like to do things that are contro-
versial—especially when there’s no precedent.”165
For example, in 2008, Pat Fitzgerald, a U.S. attorney, held a press
conference to announce criminal charges against Rod Blagojevich, the gov-
ernor of Illinois at the time.166 In the conference, Fitzgerald called
Blagojevich’s conduct “appalling,” and enough to make “Lincoln roll over
in his grave.”167 Fitzgerald was not disciplined.168
B. Copping Out On the Cops
While Rule 3.8(f) calls for prosecutors to “exercise reasonable care” to
prevent law enforcement from making prejudicial extrajudicial statements,
actually exercising the “reasonable care” can be difficult.169 Exercising rea-
sonable care is especially difficult in cross-jurisdictional investigations,
when law enforcement and the prosecution work out of different depart-
ments or agencies. For example, one former federal prosecutor said, “when
you have state prosecutors who don’t control the police or when you have
federal prosecutors working with state officers, or even sometimes agencies
outside the DOJ” then supervision can be a “problem.”170 Another former
federal prosecutor agreed, adding that “it helps to have all members of the
team to be in the same department. Control is much easier to exercise.”171
Additionally, control becomes even more difficult when dealing with
law enforcement offices headed by individuals who see themselves as
“completely independent” of the prosecutor, and who are prone to “speak-
ing their minds to the press, on a confidential basis. These ‘leaks’ typically
are reported as unattributed, making it difficult to determine who made
them.”172 On the other hand, control is easier when both law enforcement
165. Telephone interview with Joe Friedberg, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Nov. 1, 2013) (on file
with author).




168. Kelly Selesnick, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Will Pat Fitzgerald’s Public Statements
Prejudice Rod Blagojevich’s Trial?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 827, 832–33 (2010). The lack of
disciplinary action can possibly be explained by Illinois adopting a rule with a higher threshold for
prejudice: “extrajudicial comments that pose a serious and imminent threat of heightening public
condemnation of the accused  . . . .” (emphasis added). Id. at n.15.
169. See generally E-mail from Hank Shea, Senior Distinguished Fellow, UST School of Law,
to Ted Haller (Sept. 19, 2013 8:17 CST) (on file with author) (noting that prosecutors shall lead by
example and inform the Court when someone on their team violates Rule 3.8(f)); Interview with
Mark Osler, Professor of Law at UST School of Law, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 3, 2013) (train-
ing prosecutors to know what information they can share is crucial).
170. Osler Interview, supra note 169.
171. Shea E-mail, supra note 169.
172. Id.
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and prosecution are run out of the same department, such as the U.S. De-
partment of Justice, and are required to follow the same regulations.173
Departments’ varying policies create an additional hurdle to effective
control of law enforcement by prosecutors. For example, one controversial
act is the so-called perp walk, when an accused person (perpetrator) is
walked in front of news cameras—the video is then frequently looped, often
in guilt-implying slow motion, in newscasts and on the Internet.174 Perp
walks are highly prejudicial, heightening “public condemnation of the ac-
cused.”175 Perp walks serve no law enforcement purpose except, perhaps,
deterrence.176 For this reason, federal regulations prohibit employees of the
Justice Department from taking action “to encourage or assist news media
in photographing or televising a defendant or accused person being held or
transported . . . .”177 Similarly the U.S. Attorney’s Manual states “no ad-
vance information will be provided to the news media” when a search war-
rant or arrest warrant is to be executed . . . .”178 Many local departments,
including the Chicago Police Department, prohibit “[s]taging the movement
of an arrestee for the sole purpose of allowing the arrestee to be photo-
graphed or videotaped by the news media . . . .”179 However, perp walks
still occur regularly, and many law enforcement agencies have no policies
prohibiting the practice.180 If truly following the spirit of Rule 3.8(f), it is
difficult to see any situation where a perp walk is proper given that prosecu-
tors must “exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators  . . . associated
with the prosecutor . . . from making an extrajudicial statement” that has a
“substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused . . . .”181
Finally, as demonstrated by the case of prosecutors posting anonymous
comments online, infra Part II(B), social media creates an additional hurdle
in controlling the statements of law enforcement. It is nearly impossible for
a prosecutor to have the knowledge that a police officer is posting prejudi-
cial comments online, and even if the comments are not anonymous, moni-
toring social media would be unduly time-consuming.
173. See supra, Part I(C).
174. See Ernest F. Lidge, Perp Walks and Prosecutorial Ethics, 7 NEV. L.J. 55 (2006).
175. Id. at 56.
176. See id. at 66.
177. Judicial Administration Statements of Policy, 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(7) (1975).
178. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, 1-7.600 (1997), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/.
179. CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 98.
180. When I was a television news reporter, I regularly participated in the videotaping of
suspects, and was often assisted by elected county sheriffs in notifying me of the proper time and
place to access the movement of the accused. Occasionally, I had the opportunity to stick a
microphone in the individual’s face while asking suggestive questions.
181. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f). See Lidge, supra note 174, at 68–71. Lidge
makes a compelling argument that a perp walk is a “statement” as intended by Rules 3.6 and 3.8.
See id. at 57–58.
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C. When Police Get Political
Unfortunately, politics offers an incentive for both prosecutors and po-
lice to make prejudicial, extrajudicial comments.182 According to a govern-
ment study in 1998, more than 95 percent of “chief, state, and local felony
prosecuting attorneys” were elected.183 County sheriffs are elected posi-
tions.184 And of course, non-elected law enforcement officials are influ-
enced by politicians seeking desired outcomes in high-profile cases.
Therefore, both the police and prosecutors have an incentive to appear
“tough on crime,” which can lead to prejudicial, extrajudicial comments.185
Examples of these kinds of comments abound, including those discussed
infra in the introduction: a North Carolina police chief called a suspect a
“cold-blooded murderer;” a South Carolina sheriff called a suspect a “mon-
ster;” a New York sheriff called a man “cowardly.”186 Maricopa County’s
Sheriff Joe Arpaio called someone an “unfit mother” in one press release,
and another person “sick” in his office’s very next release.187
IV. REDUCING PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS BY POLICE
“We must both abide by the Bill of Rights, yet recognize when a First
Amendment freedom conflicts with a Fifth Amendment protection.”188
It took a year for the Louisiana doctor, discussed in Parts I–III, to get
back to practicing medicine; she was arrested, but never tried, for killing
patients at a hospital during Hurricane Katrina.189 The doctor’s defense at-
torney blasted the attorney general’s decision to arrest his client as “im-
proper” and “unethical” conduct.190 Meanwhile, the attorney general’s
public information director “lamented” that the doctor’s “people were free
to say anything they wanted about the events,” while “the prosecutors were
bound to say nothing about all the evidence they possessed.”191
182. See Scott M. Matheson, The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 865, 888 (1990); Stanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electo-
ral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334, 335 (2002).
183. Gordon & Huber, supra note 182, at 335.
184. David N. Falcone & L. Edward Wells, The County Sheriff as a Distinct Policing Modal-
ity, 14 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 127 (1995).
185. See generally Gordon & Huber, supra note 182, at 335 (“[p]opular wisdom suggests that
prosecutors, when seeking reelection, must cultivate the image that, as guardians of public safety,
they are ‘tough on crime’”).
186. Murphy, supra note 2; Dowty, supra note 5; Schafer, supra note 4.
187. NEWSRelease, supra note 7.
188. Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General of the United States, Remarks at the Associated
Press Managing Editors Ass’n, Dallas, Tex. (Oct. 31, 1990).
189. FINK, supra note 17, at 428–29.
190. Id. at 428.
191. Id. at 429.
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The public information officer was understandably frustrated, but the
Model Rules have it right: the prosecutor is a “minister of justice”192—one
who has the discretion of whether to charge, what to charge, who to charge,
and when to charge—possessing the ability to destroy someone’s life. The
outcome of a trial is often immaterial to the reputational, psychological,
familial, and economic toll of being named in the media as a suspect.
Therefore, in order to preserve the right to a fair trial, defense attorneys
should have greater freedom to fight back. Their clients have no choice in
their charges, but the prosecutors do.
Moreover, as this Comment has explained, there is still a loophole: law
enforcement. Police can make public and private comments, leak informa-
tion, and comment anonymously via social media. Prosecutors can help
minimize this loophole by exercising their required “reasonable care” to
ensure law enforcement’s comments are not “heightening public condemna-
tion of the accused.”193 This final part of the Comment will argue: that a
cultural paradigm shift is needed, beginning with leadership; that better
training can reduce harmful extrajudicial comments; that social media jury
instructions are needed; and that journalists need education on prosecutor’s
responsibilities.
A. An Opportunity for Leadership
Leadership is needed. A rule will not change the Supreme Court’s hes-
itance to constrain freedom of speech. A rule change will not alter the
symbiotic relationship between police and journalists. A rule change will
not shine a light on anonymous posts in social media. A rule change will
not reduce the coverage of crime in the news. A rule change will not open a
prosecutor’s schedule, allowing intensive supervision of law enforcement.
A rule change will not minimize political incentives to make harmful public
comments.
As one former federal prosecutor wrote, “[a]bove all else, prosecutors
must lead by example. Comply with Rule 3.6 and 3.8 at all times . . . The
vast majority of law enforcement personnel will follow the directions of an
authentic, rule-abiding prosecutor.”194 A law professor who studies profes-
sionalism and ethics suggests “prosecutors build social capital around the
issue of compliance, so a prosecutor who is out of line would be subject to
peer pressure and adverse peer comment.”195 Chief prosecutors—whether
at the municipal, county, state, or federal level—have an opportunity to
change a culture that has too often led to poor oversight of law enforce-
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) cmt. 1.
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f).
194. Shea E-mail, supra note 169.
195. E-mail from Neil Hamilton, Professor of Law, UST School of Law, to Ted Haller (Nov.
28, 2013 1:20 CST) (on file with author). Professor Hamilton’s biography can be viewed at http://
www.stthomas.edu/law/facultystaff/faculty/hamiltonneil/.
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ment. Effective leadership will require informing “the Court when someone
under his or her direction intentionally has violated Rule 3.6 or 3.8.”196 And
“[r]egardless of whether the Court is informed, the prosecutor should re-
move the violator from further involvement in the case at the earliest possi-
ble opportunity.”197 A criminal defense attorney agreed, arguing that “the
best thing [prosecutors] can do is establish a good relationship with law
enforcement.”198 As explained infra in Part III, asserting control in multi-
jurisdictional investigations is difficult, but the prosecutor can still exert
control by “virtue of his or her ability to refuse to work with rule
violators.”199
B. Train Anyone Who Will Listen—Including Reporters
This Comment has hopefully made clear that there is no conspiracy to
deprive accused persons of their constitutional rights. Instead, a merger of
ignorance, apathy, the media, and technological development has created an
atmosphere rife with harmful extrajudicial comments. Combating these fac-
tors requires knowledge, care, the media, and technology.
Prosecutors need to regularly train the police. Perhaps Rule 3.8(f)
would benefit from an additional comment requiring prosecutors to regu-
larly train law enforcement personnel on Rules 3.6 and 3.8, and fair-trial
concerns—just like the comment to Rule 5.1 encourages “periodic review
of compliance” in law firms. More realistically, chief prosecutors should
create department policies that require the regular training of law enforce-
ment; warn the police that prosecutors will not work with violators; estab-
lish that prosecutors may publicly admonish violators; clarify that the
prohibition applies to both traditional media relations and social media; and
explain that a body of empirical studies shows the adverse impact of pretrial
publicity. This kind of training will lead to increased knowledge, more con-
cern, cautious media relations, and restraint in social media.
Training should not end with the police. While not beholden to the
rules, journalists should still have a rudimentary understanding that the
prosecutors and police do not have unlimited leeway to make comments on
cases. Of course, journalists will still push for maximum information. How-
ever, the training could reduce any temptation to frame undisclosed infor-
mation as a cover-up, a concern brought to the attention of the Associated
Press by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh in 1990:
This appetite has given rise to a considerable temptation for a
prosecutor to exceed the proper role he must play in our criminal
justice system, a temptation heightened by a small but vocal cho-
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Friedberg Interview, supra note 165.
199. Id.
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rus which shouts ‘Cover-up!’ or ‘Whitewash!’ every time a prose-
cutor refuses comment on a pending investigation . . . .200
And reporters should gently be reminded of the Society of Professional
Journalists Code of Ethics, which calls on journalists to “minimize
harm.”201
C. More Social Media Policies Needed
Prosecutors and police need social media guidelines. Thoughtful use of
social media by law enforcement can engage the community, resulting in
better communication and enhanced trust. However, personnel need to un-
derstand that posting comments, even off-the-clock or in a civilian capacity,
can dramatically affect the outcome of a case—as it did for the New Orle-
ans police officers released from prison, discussed infra in Part II. Addition-
ally, judges should more specifically address social media use in their jury
instructions and courtroom policies; instructions should include familiar
language in the use of social media terms and warn of consequences for not
following instructions.202
CONCLUSION
“There’s a pale horse coming/ And I’m going to ride it/ I’ll rise in the
morning/ My fate decided/ I’m a dead man walking.”203
The complexity of life can be exhausting. Perhaps one reason why
trials capture our attention is their perceived simplicity. The lines are
drawn. Two sides to a story. A fate in the hands of a judge or jury. Truth
only a verdict away. While most trials are actually much more complex
than how they are portrayed or covered, perception can become reality, and
reality can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is a gravitational force
that pulls us into joining the narrative, no matter how false it is. We want to
be a part of the grand story that is the criminal justice system.
We must fight that force. Instead of joining the story, we need to re-
write the story. And what a beautiful story there is to write: ministers of
justice ensuring that the game is fair even if it is to their disadvantage; a
two-sided story becomes as complicated as humanity; the rules remain a
cushion rather than a spring.
In Bruce Springsteen’s “Dead Man Walking,” a song about a man
awaiting his execution, the condemned removes himself from the world
200. Thornburgh speech, supra note 188.
201. Code of Ethics, SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, available at http://www.spj.org/
pdf/ethicscode.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
202. See St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 133, at 19.
203. Bruce Springsteen, Dead Man Walking, on DEAD MAN WALKING (Columbia Records
1996).
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even before his execution does so.204 “Now I’ve got my story/ Mister, ain’t
no need for you to listen/ It’s just a dead man talking.”205 The condemned
feels no need to tell his story. No one will listen, and even if someone did,
his story would not matter.
The Sixth Amendment exists to avoid that premature removal of an
accused’s voice. Neither the prosecutor nor the police get to choose the
moment when the accused becomes silenced—preempted by the other
voices. Yet this is precisely what harmful extrajudicial comments do: they
drown out the voice of the accused.
The condemned man in “Dead Man Walking” observes that
“[b]etween our dreams and actions lies this world.”206 Let’s close the gap.
We can do a better job of ensuring fair trials in this world by using Rule
3.8(f) to minimize the harmful effects of extrajudicial prejudicial comments
made by law enforcement.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
